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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VAUGHN JUDD and ORA NELL JUDD,
his wife,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
-vs)
KANAB CITY, A body politic and
corporate under the laws of the
State of Utah; GAYLEN HOYT and
JOLYNN HOYT his wife; and ORVIL
ROBINSON and LULA ROBINSON, his
wife,

Case No. 18300

)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents

)

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a consolidation of two
district court actions.

Plaintiff-Appellants, Vaughn Judd

and Ora Nell Judd, his wife, brought suit against Kanab City
and the four individuals seeking to quite title to certain
real property and seeking an injunction against the
Defendant-Respondents to enjoin the construction of a road
on the real property.
The other matter was a probate petition filed by
the Defendant-Respondent Kanab City.

The action sought the

issuance of a Probate Judge's Deed to that same real
property described in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
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Plaintiffs protested the issuance of a probate
deed to Kanab City.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The Court below, following consolidated trial,
found in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, ruling
that the area in question was indeed a city street.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts by Plaintiff-Appellants
outlines the procedural matters leading to this position in
the lawsuit but does not outline the facts and transactions
prior to the filing of these cases.

The following

recitation of facts is consistent with the Findings made by
the lower court.
The trial court found that a plat located in the
Off ice of Kane County Recorder showing the Kanab City area
was not officially recorded but was actually used as an
official Kanab City plat since "time irrunemorial."
'1(8)

(Findings

The plat designated as streets those portions of real
(Findings ~9)

property sought by Plaintiffs.

The disputed

area had been used for gardens, plants and animal grazing
and had never been officially opened as street or used as
streets.

(Findings '1[10 and 11)
In spite of those somewhat inconsistent uses,

"from time immemorial" the subject property has "been
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recognized by the public as portions of Third North Street
and Fourth West Street belonging to Kanab City.''

{Findings

~11)

The Court found that there was no evidence that
the Plaintiffs or their predecessors had occupied or used
the disputed land prior to the entry of the Kanab townsite
and that in fact the Plaintiffs and their predecessors had
recognized the designation of the disputed area as city
streets.

{Findings

~12

and 15)

No taxes had ever been

assessed on the property platted as streets and no one
{including the Plaintiffs) had ever paid taxes on that
property.

(Findings
There was a

~18)

(City Council) meeting on July 8,

1975, at which Plaintiffs presented a petition requesting
abandonment of the street area.

The city council voted

favorably, but there was total failure to comply with the
requirements of Utah statutes and the effort for abandonment
was of no effect.

{Findings

~19)
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ARGUMENT
Defendant-Appellants are entitled to this Court's
affirmance of the trial court's Judgment.

Plaintiff-

Appellants have failed to challenge any of the lower court's
findings, which are amply supported by the record.

Without

a challenge of these findings, the decision below is
unimpeachable since its legal premises are sound.

POINT I

THE LOWER COURTS' DECISION IS ENTITLED
TO PRESUMPTIONS OF VALIDITY

Plaintiff-Appellants have appealed from the lower
court's decision without challenging any of the factual
determinations made.

Further, no transcript of the trial is

available to support any such challenge.
Where no transcript of trial is available, the
trial court's actions are presumed valid.
Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447
P.2d 927

Goodman v.

(Utah 1981), Estate of Thorley, 579

(Utah 1978).
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POINT II

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM TO THE LAND
UNDER THE FEDERAL TOWNSITE ACT

The original site for Kanab City was designated
pursuant to federal statutes enacted by the United States
Congress in 1820 and 1867.

The first law was entitled "An

Act Making Further Provisions for the Sale of the Public
Lands."

The second was entitled "An Act for the Relief of

the Inhabitants of Cities and Towns Upon the Public Lands,"
and is commonly known as the Federal Townsite Act.

These

laws together established the authority for a state or
territory to prescribe rules and regulations whereby a
townsite could be established and disposal made of public
land.
A portion of the Federal Townsite Act, 14 Stat.
541, 43 U.S.C.A., §718, provides as follows:
That whenever any portion of the public lands of
the United States have been or shall be settled
upon and occupied as a townsite, and therefore not
subject to entry under the agricultural
pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such
town shall be incorporated, for the corporate
authorities thereof, and if not incorporated, for
the judge of the county court for the county in
which such town may be situated, to enter at the
proper land office, and at the minimum price, the
land so settled and occupied, in trust for the
several use and benefit of the occupants thereof,
according to their respective interests; the
execution of which trust, as to the disposal of
the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the
sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules
and regulations as may be prescribed by the
legislative authority of the State or Territory in
which the same may be situated ...
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The Federal Townsite Act was amended on June 8,
1868,

(15 Stat. 67), so as to require not only the payment

of the minimum price for such lands but also the costs of
surveying.
The Territorial Legislature of Utah, as
authorized, enacted on February 17, 1869, an act known as
the Territorial Townsite Act. C.L. Utah 1867, §1166

e~.

seq.

The substance of the Territorial Townsite Act is still
retained in Utah law and is presently found at Section
57-7-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann.

(1953), as amended.

Section 57-7-1 provides that when the District
Judge (formerly the

Probat~

Judge) entered at the proper

land office the land occupied and settled as a city or town
i t was his duty "to dispose of and convey the title to such
land, or to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares
thereof, to the persons entitled thereto," as determined by
law.
The Territorial Townsite Act further provided that
after entry of the land public notice was to be given, and
within six (6) months after the first publication, every
person claiming any lot or parcel of land within the land
entered was required to specify in writing, giving an
accurate description of the land claimed, all property he
claimed to be entitled to receive [Sections 57-7-2, 3 Utah
Code Annotated (1953)].

Section 57-7-3 further provides
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that any person failing to make and deliver to the Clerk of
the Court his claim within the six {6) months provided by
law would be "forever barred of the right of claiming or
recovering such land, or any interest or estate therein or
in any part thereof, in any court."

The Court could, for

good cause shown, extend the time for filing a claim, but
not to exceed one (1) year from the date the notice was
first published.
Defendant's Exhibit 39 contains a copy of the
Patent for the Kanab Townsite issued to William A.
Bringhurst, County Judge in and for the County of Kane, Utah
Territory, by Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United
States of America.

This document was dated May 15, 1880,

and was filed for record with the Kane County Recorder on
March 7, 1889.

A careful reading of the document indicates

Judge Bringhurst had entered the land containing the Kanab
Townsite with the General Land Office of the United States
at Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, had made full payment
therefore, and was entitled to the issuance of a patent for
the Kanab Townsite.
Inasmuch as no proof to the contrary was presented
at trial it is conclusive that the statutory provisions for
the disposal of the land within the Kanab Townsite were
complied with, i.e. that within thirty (30) days after the
entry of such lands public notice was given and all
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claimants were given an opportunity to claim the land they
were then occupying or in which they had any interest.
The record is clear that Plaintiff-Appellants'
predecessors in interest did not claim the land under the
provisions of Section 57-7-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
If the Plaintiff-Appellants' predecessors in
interest did not claim the land then the land would have
been disposed of as unclaimed land.

The present provision

for the disposal of unclaimed lands is contained in Section
57-7-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953).

However the language

contained in the Territorial Townsite Act, which governed in
1880, is more detailed and for that reason reference is made
to that act.

Section 1175 of the Territorial Townsite Act

provided that if unclaimed lands remained after the
expiration of time for filing claims then the Probate Judge
was obligated to "cause the same to be surveyed and laid out
into suitable blocks and lots, and shall reserve such
portions as may be deemed necessary for public squares,
school houses or hospital lots, and shall cause all
necessary streets, roads, lanes and alleys to be laid out
through the same, a plot of which, properly certified, shall
be recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which
the same may be situated"

[emphasis added].

Section 1175

further provided that the Probate Judge could then "sell the
lots or blocks so laid out, and not reserved for public use

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

in suitable parcels, to possessor[s] of adjoining lands or
to other citizens of such city or town."
The evidence received in the instant case
indicates that the land in question was platted prior to
be~ng

occupied, that it was then sold to the Plaintiffs'

predecessor in interest, and that the conveyance to the
Plaintiffs predecessor did not contain the real property
that had been previously platted as public streets.

Plaintiffs Have No Pre-Townsite Claim
Defendants Exhibits 27, 30, 31 and 39 show that no
claim was made by Plaintiff-Appellants predecessors to
having rights prior to the townsite plat.

In fact, the

minutes for the Probate Court's proceedings of April 8,
1892 show Plaintiffs predecessor, Joseph G. Brown, appeared
and took action inconsistent with any claim of prior right.
The minutes reflect that Mr. Brown presented a
deed to the Court which had been issued to him by Kane
County and which contained an error both as to the location
of and the amount of the real property.

According to the

minutes Mr. Brown claimed that he was only entitled to 15
acres rather than 23 acres and 6 rods.

He asked that his

deed be corrected and the proper amount of land be given to
him.

In conformity with his request the Court ordered the
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preparation of the new deed conveying to Mr. Brown the
following described lots in accordance with a survey that
had been recently made:
"Lots 3 & 4 in B. 56·. Lots 3 and 4 in B. 57 in Plat
A. Lots 1-2-3-4 in B. 7. Lots 1-2-3-4 in B.8
Plat C, comprised in the Sl/2 of Sec. 21, and
within the Corporate limits as platted in the
Recorders (sic) Office."
No mention is made of the property comprising the
streets of Fourth West and Third North.

Had those streets

been omitted by error, Mr. Brown would have had the
opportunity to once again return to the Court to have the
error corrected.

He obviously know the

p~ocedure

to correct

an error.
The probate minutes clearly indicate that the
hearing concerned the title to lands within the corporate
limits of Kanab that had been "advertised and platted by the
Probate Judge."

The fact that the lands in question had

been platted is very important to the determination of the
issues before this Court.

There would have been no need to

plat the property had Mr. Brown been an original claimant
under the Territorial Townsite Act.

All he would have had

to do was file his written claim in compliance with the
statutory guidelines and he would have been entitled to all
of the property which he was occupying or possessing at the
time the Kanab Townsite was entered.

This hearing was some

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

twelve years after the issuance of the patent, and some
three years after the patent was recorded.

The statutory

time period for filing an original claim had long since
lapsed.

Pertinent Case Law
The two leading Utah cases which construe the
Townsite Act and the provisions of Section 57-7-1 et seq.
are Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703
(1946) and Cox v. Carlisle, 11 Utah 2d 372, 359 P.2d 1049
(1961).
Plaintiff-Appellants rely on the Hall case, but it
is factually dissimilar.

In the Hall case the Utah Supreme

Court, on rehearing, held that where the Plaintiffs had
shown that at and prior to the time the townsite was entered
they or their predecessors in interest had occupied and used
the land and had continued to so occupy it until the filing
of the action that they had obtained "an equitable ownership
in the property which [they were] occupying at the time of
the entry,

[and] that such ownership became a vested right

when the lands were entered in the land office."

In each of

the cases relied on as precedent in the Hall opinion the
fact situations were such that each claimant could show
evidence to the effect that either they or their
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predecessors in interest were the occupants of the land in
question at the time the entry of the townsite was made.
In the Cox case, the Plaintiff-citizen appealed
from judgment in favor of the Defendant city.
adjudged owner of the street.

The city was

Significant in the Courts

reasoning was a distinction between Cox and Hall:
No evidence of occupancy of the street by
plaintiff and her predecessors, at the time of the
deeds, the Townsite Entry of the petition for
confirmation, is reflected in the record.
Therefore, Hall v. North Ogden City, upon which
plaintiff so heavily leans, seems uncontrolling.
11 Utah 2d at 372.
The same facts are in evidence here, and the trial court
should likewise be affirmed.
The present case can be distinguished from the
£acts of the Hall case and those cases ref erred to in the
Hall opinion.

The trial court found there was no testimony

nor documentary evidence showing the occupancy of the land
in question prior to or at the time the Kanab Townsite was
entered with the Land Office in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Wesley Theo McAllister, who was called as a
witness by the Plaintiffs, testified that he was born in
1905 and that he had a memory of events that transpired in
1910.

This is thirty years after the patent for the City of

Kanab was issued to the Probate Judge.

It is twenty-one

years after the patent was recorded and became public
record.

On cross-examination Mr. McAllister testified that

the property in question was not occupied until his
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

grandfather obtained it and that he did not know whether his
grandfather "had ever even grew anything."

The Plaintiffs,

whose burden it is to show occupancy by themselves or their
predecessors in interest both before and at the time of the
Townsite Entry, showed none.

Not only did the Plaintiffs

fail to show such proof but the evidence received by the
Court would indicate that the contrary was the case, i.e.
that the Plaintiffs-Appellants' predecessors in interest did
not in fact occupy the property in question prior to or at
the time of entry but were not occupants of said property
until after the townsite had been entered and the unclaimed
land had been platted, advertised and sold.
It is the Defendants-Respondents' position that
the Cox case is controlling on the facts of the case now
before this Court.

A careful analysis of the facts of that

case reveals the following similarities:
1.

In the Cox case at the time the Plaintiff's

predecessors obtained confirmation of title from the Probate
Court they asserted no claim as to title to or occupancy of
any part of the platted street.

Likewise in the present

case at the time Joseph G. Brown obtained a corrected
confirmation of his title from the Probate Court he asserted
no claim as to title to or occupancy of any part of either
Third North Street of Fourth West Street.
2.

In Cox there was no evidence of occupancy of

the street by the Plaintiff or her predecessors, "at the
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time of the deeds, the Townsite Entry or the petition for
confirmation."

It was for this reason and this reason alone

that the Court distinguished the Cox case from the Hall case
and found that holding as not controlling.

Likewise in the

case at bar there was no evidence presented of occupancy at
the time of the Townsite Entry, or at the issuance of the
deed or when Mr. Brown's petition for confirmation or a
corrected deed was heard.
3.

In both Cox and the present case there was no

showing that taxes had ever been paid on the platted roads;
likewise neither Manti City nor Kanab City had ever claimed
of anyone taxes on the roads in question.
4.

In both cases some ninety years had elapsed

before the Plaintiffs challenged the ownership of the
platted streets in the municipalities.
In sununary, the Plaintiffs-Appellants, whose
burden it was to show occupancy by them or their
predecessors before and at the time of the Townsite Entry,
showed none.

Thus, Hall is not controlling and the

application of the Cox holding would require the Court to
affirm the trial court.
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POINT III KANAB CITY HAS NOT ABANDONED FOURTH WEST
STREET
Appellants claim the action of the Kanab City
Council on July 8, 1975, was sufficient to constitute an
abandonment of the street.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 indicates

that in that City Council meeting, the Plaintiffs' petition
requesting the City to abandon Fourth West Street, was read
and considered.

After some discussion a motion was made,

seconded and passed to abandon the street.

No further

action was taken.
The statutory procedure for a city to abandon or
vacate a street is set forth in Utah Code Annotated §10-8-8
et. seq.

A brief review of the procedure will show that the

attempt of July 8, 1975, to abandon Fourth West Street was
void for failure to comply with the law.
Section 10-8-8.1 establishes in detail the
procedure that must be followed for a city council to
consider a petition to vacate a road or street as follows:
On petition by a person owning a lot in a city,
praying that a street ..• in the immediate vicinity
of such lot may be vacated, ... the governing body
of such city, upon hearing, and upon being
satisfied that there is good cause for
such ... vacation ... , that it will not be
detrimental to the general interest, and that it
should be made, may declare by ordinance such
street ... vacated ... [emphasis added]
Section 10-8-8.3 requires that notice of the city
council's intention to vacate a street, or any part thereof,
be given, except where the council has obtained the written
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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consent to such vacation from all of the owners of property
abutting the street to be vacated.

Section 10-8-8.4

provides the type of notice to be given as follows:
No street .•. shall be so vacated, unless notice of
the pendency of the petition and prayer thereof,
and the date of the hearing therein, is such
petition is filed, ••• be given by publishing in a
newspaper published or of general circulation in
such city once a week for four consecutive weeks
preceding action on such petition ... , and by
mailing such notice to all owners of record of
land abutting the street ••. proposed to be vacated
addressed to the mailing addresses appearing on
the rolls of the county assessor of the county
wherein said land is located. Action thereon
shall take place within three months after the
completion of notice.
Further, without the requisite notice, the meeting
of July 8, 1975, could not qualify as the required hearing.
Finally, no ordinance was passed.
motion.

There was merely a

The requisite findings of public benefit were not

made.
Kanab City failed to comply with the following
statutory requirements in its attempt to abandon Fourth West
Street:
1.
2.
3.
4.

No ordinance was adopted
No hearing was held.
Proper notice was not given.
Statutorily required findings were not made.

The effect of the deficiencies of the July 8, 1975
meeting is clearly stated in Utah Code Annotated Section
10-8-8.4 "no street ... shall be so vacated, unless notice .•. ,
and the date of the hearing ... be given •.• "
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Without even considering the legality of the
manner in which the City Council attempted to abandon the
street, we note from the evidence received by the trial
Court that on at least nine other occasions after the
meeting of July 8, 1975, the City Council discussed Fourth
West Street and on none of those occasions did they
acknowledge the fact they considered the street abandoned.
In fact, in the majority of those discussions the City
Council asserted its ownership or control over the street
and persisted with the notion of opening the street to the
public.

See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,

14, and 15.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the lower court should be
DATED this

_!b~irrned

____,_Sf'_)day

of

in all respects.

w~~

1982.

Snow & Nuffer
A Professional Corporation

F. KIRK HEATON
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